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Economic literature on the explanation of public deficits has been focusing on two 
main issues. On one hand, the accumulation of public debts in recent decades and, on 
the other hand, the large observed cross-countries differences on public deficits and 
debt. Economic arguments alone are not sufficient to explain this behavior. Therefore, 
recent political economy literature emphasizes the role of political and institutional 
factors in the explanation of the fiscal policy and, in particular, of the budget balances 
behavior. This paper surveys a set of political-economic models of budget deficits, 
providing an up-to-date, critical review of the main models. The main conclusion is 
the need of conducting more rigorous empirical tests. 
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RESUMO 
A literatura económica sobre défices públicos tem assentado em duas questões 
fundamentais. Por um lado, a acumulação da dívida pública, nas últimas décadas, e, 
por outro lado, nas expressivas diferenças observadas, ao nível do défice e da dívida 
públicos, entre países. Por si só, os argumentos económicos não têm sido capazes de 
explicar este comportamento. A literatura político-económica tem sublinhado o papel 
dos factores políticos e institucionais na explicação da política orçamental e, em 
particular, no comportamento do saldo orçamental. Este trabalho discute um conjunto 
de modelos político-económicos dos défices orçamentais, fornecendo uma revisão 
actualizada e crítica dos principais modelos. A principal conclusão assenta na 
necessidade de desenvolver uma análise empírica mais rigorosa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Observed fiscal policy, in last decades, has varied greatly, both across time and across 
industrialized countries. The same has happened with the composition of spending. 
This trend however has been accompanied by persistent public deficits and, therefore, 
growing public debts. 
This paper discusses how the political economy literature has been answering the 
following questions: 1) Why did certain industrialized countries, but not others, 
accumulate large public debts? and 2) Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the 
last thirty or twenty years rather than before? 
These issues have been analyzed for a long time but in a normative perspective 
(Barro, 1979 and Lucas and Stockey, 1983). This literature has particularly focused 
on the median-voter equilibrium, which applies to policy issues where disagreement 
between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. In this kind of set up, a political 
equilibrium selects the policy preferred by the voter with median preferences. 
One of the basic predictions of such an analysis is that the parties that run for an 
office will always announce platforms very similar among them and approaching the 
one preferred by the median voter. Therefore, one should not observe significant 
differences in the implemented policy depending on what party wins the electoral 
competition. On theoretical ground the failures of median-voter predictions have been 
explained using arguments related to the observation that usually the political space 
concerns much more than one single dimension. 
More recently, in the context of the public choice school, a positive approach of these 
questions has emerged from the combination of economic and political analysis 
(Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989; Roubini and Sachs, 1989, and Alesina and Tabellini, 
1990). There has been an increasing agreement on the way one should approach the 
analysis of public policies. Now, it is usually assumed that policy choices are not 
made by a hypothetical benevolent social planner, but rather by purposeful political 
agents participating in a well defined decision-making process. The natural way to 
deal with such a situation is to combine economic theory with the analysis of 
alternative collective choice procedures (Fortunato, 2001). 
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 consists of a brief description 
of the observed public debt and deficits path across industrialized countries and over   3
time. Section 3 presents the tax-smoothing model, showing that this approach alone 
cannot provide complete answers to the questions above. In particular, economic 
arguments alone are not sufficient to explain the large cross-countries differences 
among industrialized democracies, all with high levels of per capita income. Section 
4 provides a brief literature survey on politico-institutional determinants of the 
government budget. Recent empirical evidence on the issue is presented in Section 5 
and finally Section 6 concludes. 
2. PUBLIC DEBT AND DEFICITS: SOME EVIDENCE 
The literature on political models of budget deficits has been focusing on two main 
questions. The first one concerns the explanation of why there has been in the last 
years a significant accumulation of the debt-to-GDP ratios, in the industrialized 
countries. 














































































































































Chart 1 shows that, for the data in Table 1 (see the Appendix
1), there has been an 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio average from 1970 (37,5%) to the middle of the 
eighties (66,3%, in 1986). After a short stable period, the debt-to-GDP ratio average 
has begun to increase again, from 1990 (60,9%) to 1995 (76,3%). In the past six 
years, the debt-to-GDP ratio has been decreasing. The overall evolution of the past 
                                                     
1 The sample includes the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and the United States of America.   4
thirty years shows a tendency of increase (from an average of 37,5%, in 1970, to 
64,0%, in 2001). 
The second question concerns the large cross-countries differences of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. The standard deviation has been in the last thirty years, on average, of 22 
points, revealing large cross-countries differences. 
Chart 2 shows the evolution of the two countries with the highest average in the 
sample period (Belgium and Italy) and the two with the lowest average (Norway and 
Germany)
2. 














































































































































In 1970, the highest value belonged to the United Kingdom (78,0%) and the lowest to 
Japan (10,5%). In 2001, the highest value belonged to Japan (119,4%) and the lowest 
to Australia (22,6%). 
                                                     
2 Note that for Australia there is only data available for the period after 1987.   5














































































































































Turning the analysis to the primary government balance, Chart 3 (see Table 2 in the 
Appendix) shows that the primary balance-to-GDP ratio average has been rather 
unstable. Note, however, that in the European Union the performance has been, on 
average, improving from the end of the nineties. Norway, Denmark and Finland show 
the best performances in the sample period while Italy, Greece, Spain and Japan 
exhibit the worse performances. The lowest value of the sample period belongs to 
Sweden in 1993 (-10,8%) and the highest to Norway in 2001 (+10,3%). 
Chart 4 shows the performance of Norway, the country with the best performance on 
average, and Italy, the country with the worst one. 
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3. THE TAX-SMOOTHING MODEL AS A BENCHMARK 
The tax-smoothing theory of the government budget (Barro, 1979 and Lucas and 
Stockey, 1983) serves as a normative benchmark from which political economy 
models depart, although some authors view this approach as a description of actual 
fiscal policy. In fact, most of the recent political models are positive explanations of 
the observed deviations from the tax-smoothing approach (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). 
In general, positive theories of budget deficits try to explain the differences between 
normative predictions and empirical evidence by relaxing the assumptions of the 
normative theory concerning actor’s preferences or institutional arrangements. 
The standard tax-smoothing argument notes that the government, who is a 
“benevolent social planner” that maximizes the utility of the representative agent, 
needs to finance a certain amount of spending in every period through taxes on labor 
income (it assumes a closed economy without capital). Taxes are distortionary 
because they affect labor supply. Both the government and the agent have an infinite 
temporal horizon, which means that neither intergenerational effects nor the finite 
terms of office for government are taken into account. The representative agent 
consumes, works and saves. The representative’s agent utility function depends upon 
private consumption and leisure but not on the amount of the public good defined as 
defense spending. 
The government’s aim is to keep the tax rate constant. The level of taxes is 
determined by the intertemporal budget constraint, which implies that the present 
value of spending (exogenously given) has to be equal to the present value of taxes. 
When public deficits result in an increase of the debt, the agents know that the 
government will need to raise taxes. As, according to the theory of permanent income, 
each agent determines his level of consumption according to the present value of his 
future income, it is equivalent to finance public spending by taxation or by deficits.  
Therefore, given the distortionary effects of taxation, the optimal strategy of the 
government is to use budget deficits and surpluses to smooth the economy, given a 
certain path of spending: deficits occur when spending is temporarily high and 
surpluses when spending is low. Therefore, according to the model, budget deficits 
follow economic cycles: low in period of economic growth, high in periods of 
recession.   7
If spending is high today and low tomorrow, a balanced budget policy would imply 
high taxes today and low taxes tomorrow. On the other hand, a tax-smoothing policy, 
with constant tax rates, leads to a deficit today and a surplus tomorrow, which, in 
present value terms, compensates for today’s deficit. 
The tax-smoothing policy dominates because the government’s loss function is 
concave in taxes, that is, variations in the tax rate over time are costly. So, the 
additional tax distortions today more than compensate for the utility gains of the 
lower taxes of tomorrow, due to decreasing marginal utilities. 
The principle of tax-smoothing is clear: budget deficits and surpluses are used 
optimally to minimize the distortionary effects of taxation, given a certain path of 
spending. This principle can be extended to the cyclical fluctuations of tax revenues 
due to the business cycle. In this context, tax rates should be approximately constant 
over the business cycle. Therefore, deficits should be observed under recessions and 
compensated by surpluses in expansions, so that cyclical fluctuations of output imply 
a cyclically adjusted balanced budget rule: the budget should be balanced over the 
business cycle but not every fiscal year. 
More generally, whatever level of spending governments may desire, fixing the time-
path of tax rates would be the optimal way to finance it, implying that optimizing 
governments should incur in deficits only when there are unanticipated or temporary 
shocks to revenues or spending. Therefore, the government should borrow when the 
expected long-run growth-rate exceeds the expected long-run real-interest-rate 
because, under those conditions, the expected ability to repay debt is growing faster 
via growth of the tax base than debt would be expected to grow via its real-interest 
burden. The government should reduce debt when the opposite relationship holds 
(Franzese, 2001). 
According to Alesina and Perotti (1995), in spite of its validity as a normative theory, 
the tax-smoothing approach is deficient as a positive theory of fiscal budgets. In fact, 
this explanation does not answer the questions of why there are cross-country 
differences and why there has been a debt accumulation in the past years. Positive 
contributions have searched for political and institutional determinants of budget 
deficits and public debts.   8
On one hand, the large increases in debt-to-GNP ratios in some countries, than begun 
in the middle of the 70’s, cannot be explained by the miscalculations of the rates of 
growth that followed a period of recession in 1973-74. On the other hand, different 
countries may have been hit by different shocks and their expectations about future 
spending might have been different but this is not sufficient to explain the large 
observed cross-country differences. 
Previous empirical work on the tax-smoothing hypothesis emphasized atypical 
government spending increases associated with wars. However, since 1945, wars have 
not been important sources of fluctuations in spending or revenues in developed 
democracies; large movements in unemployment, growth rates, and interest rates, 
contrarily, have been. Also, the tax-smoothing theory was developed and tested 
primarily within closed-economy frameworks. But the basic intuition that 
governments should debt-finance temporary shocks and tax-finance permanent 
spending requirements extends easily to open economies. Weak (strong) economic 
performance due to adverse (beneficial) terms-of-trade shocks, if expected to be 
temporary, should induce governments to increase (decrease) debt. Thus, the relevant 
empirical implications of normative theories are that governments’ debts and deficits 
respond to movements relative to expected permanent levels in unemployment, 
economic growth, debt-service costs (past debt), differences between expected real-
growth and expected real-interest rates, and terms-of-trade (Franzese, 2001 and 
Imbeaud and Chenard, 2002). Therefore, the tax-smoothing theory provides the 
baseline model and is used only to identify the economic variables for which any 
empirical work of public debt determination should control. 
The unique aspect of tax-smoothing theory is its distinction between temporary and 
permanent movements, which models without foresighted policy-makers would 
emphasize much less. Unfortunately, no commonly accepted method of empirically 
distinguishing unexpected and expected-temporary from expected-permanent shocks 
has been developed (Franzese, 2001). 
4. RECENT POLITICAL ECONOMY LITERATURE AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS: MAIN THEORETICAL MODELS 
This section presents a survey on the economic literature of political-economic 
models of budget deficits, which are basically organized following Alesina and   9
Perotti (1995) and Alesina et al (1997). For easy of exposition, we group the different 
models into seven classes
3: 
i) models based upon opportunistic policy-makers and naïve voters with fiscal illusion 
ii) models based upon the assumption of ideological policy-makers 
iii) models of debt as a strategic variable 
iv) models of redistribution conflicts 
v) models of conflicts among political parties 
vi) models of geographically dispersed interests 
vii) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions 
Models of opportunistic behavior 
These models, developed by the public choice school, are based on two main 
assumptions. On one hand, voters do not take into account the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint (in particular, they overestimate the benefits of 
current expenditures and underestimate current and future tax burdens). On the other 
hand, policy-makers are opportunistic and take advantage of voters’ myopia and, 
therefore, use budget deficits to increase their chances of being reelected. 
Opportunistic politicians who want to be reelected take advantage of voters’ illusion 
by increasing spending more than taxes, in pre-electoral moments, to please the naïve 
voters. The theory of political business cycle, which predicts that deficits are higher 
before elections than in post-electoral periods, was first presented by Nordhaus 
(1975). 
In fact, the political business cycle literature has brought some contributions to the 
fiscal illusion approach. The argument is that, in elections years, politicians follow 
                                                     
3 Imbeau and Chenard (2002) propose a different grouping of these positive contributions based on 
two sets of modifications in the assumptions of the normative model: assumptions related to actor 
preferences and assumptions related to institutional arrangements. The former set includes models that 
discuss the opportunistic and ideological behavior of decision-makers as well as the hypothesis of 
infinite temporal horizon (models of debt as a strategic variable and models of intergenerational 
redistribution); the latter includes political and budgetary institutions considerations.   10
expansionary policies and are rewarded by these measures because voters do not learn 
that these pre-electoral expansionary policies lead to post-electoral recessions. 
According to this school, discretionary stabilization policies become asymmetric: 
politicians are always willing to run deficits in recessions but never willing to run 
surpluses when recessions are over. This approach can explain expansionary fiscal 
policies in electoral moments, as voters do not punish politicians for conducting 
policies leading to excessive deficits. 
These models have, however, been largely criticized. The notion of fiscal illusion is 
not considered reasonable because it implies a systematic bias in voters’ errors. If 
those errors were uncorrelated, on average voters would not underestimate or 
overestimate the costs and benefits of taxes and spending. It is easily assumed that 
voters make mistakes and are not fully informed but it is not so obvious why these 
errors should be biased in a certain direction, that is, they systematically 
underestimate the tax burden relative to the benefits of spending. 
Moreover, these models fail to explain the accumulation of debts and the existing 
differences between countries. On one hand, it is not conceivable that fiscal illusion 
appeared only in the 1970’s. On the other hand, the only explanation for the large 
cross-countries differences would be the fact that voters are more naïve in some 
countries than in other countries, which does not seem a reasonable explanation. 
Some issues are, however, still being studied. Namely, the analysis of if different tax 
structure and fiscal institutions may lead to more or less fiscal illusion but more 
research has to be carried out on this subject (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). 
As a consequence, these models have been also developed on the basis of rational 
expectations according to which rational voters cannot be deceived over long periods 
(Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). The rational approach supported the existence of electoral 
cycles concerning fiscal policy even when voters are not myopic being enough for 
them to be imperfectly informed; it is possible for the decision-makers to create 
temporary illusion so that voters can be, at least temporarily, fooled. 
Therefore, models based on the notion of fiscal illusion are suitable for explaining 
short-run fluctuations in budget deficits around elections but not public debt long-run 
behavior, neither differences across industrialized countries.   11
Models of ideological behavior 
According to the theory of partisan cycles, politicians are ideological (Hibbs, 1986). 
In the simplest version of the theory, it is assumed that there are two types of policy-
makers, both maximizing the interest of the supporting voters. 
The author concludes that left-wing voters belong, in general, to low-income groups 
and are mainly owners of labor, suffering more seriously the costs of unemployment. 
On the other hand, the owners of capital are mainly right-wing voters being 
particularly sensitive to inflation. Therefore, left-wing supporters are more averse to 
unemployment while right-wing supporters are more averse to inflation. 
Fiscal policy tends to reflect these interests: left-wing governments favor 
expansionary policies and right-wing governments tend to conduct restrictive policies. 
The left-wing party supporters favor more public spending and therefore more deficits 
while right-wing voters favor less expenditure and lower deficits. 
In summary, the partisan cycles theory predicts that deficits will be higher when a 
left-wing party is in power and lower when a right-wing party is in office. Of course, 
this theory may help to explain some cross-country differences, although it is not 
always consistent with reality, but does not help to explain the generalized observed 
public debt accumulation. 
Models of debt as a strategic variable 
There are several political-economic explanations for the recent accumulation of 
government debt in industrialized countries. In the strategic debt behavior models, the 
assumption of an infinite temporal horizon, assumed in the tax-smoothing approach, 
is relaxed. The idea is that the current policy-maker can affect the economic 
conditions inherited by his successors through his choice of fiscal policy. If the 
government anticipates the possibility of defeat in the next election, it can use the debt 
strategically in order to influence the policy of its successor. In other words, one can 
look upon debt as a commitment device in a political game between current and future 
governments, where future tax revenues are committed to debt service. 
If current and future governments have different preferences on fiscal policy, the 
policy conducted by the current government will impose some restrictions on the   12
choices made by the next governments as fiscal choices determine the size of the debt. 
The stock of debt links past policies to future policies. 
Different governments in office at different times can take advantage of this strategic 
possibility and this political game will lead to an accumulation of the debt level above 
the optimal level prescribed by the tax-smoothing theory. Pettersson (2001) mentions 
two different approaches, both of which emphasize strategic considerations in the 
making of debt policy. The first one was developed by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) 
and the other one by Persson and Svensson (1989). In both contributions, 
governments with different preferences alternate in office. 
The first approach is presented by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) who assume a two-
party system in which the two parties differ with respect to their preferences about the 
composition of government spending. For example, consider a government who wants 
to spend a lot on defense and little on welfare, and assume that it knows that it is 
going to be replaced by another government who has the opposite preference. The 
current government realizes that defense spending will be cut in the future anyway so 
it borrows a lot now because the marginal cost of repaying the extra currency unit of 
debt will fall on welfare which it cares little about. In other words, a deficit bias will 
emerge because the government who borrows faces an asymmetry. When the policy-
maker borrows, he can spend the extra sources in the way he wants but uncertainty 
about who will be appointed in the future prevents the current policy-maker from 
fully internalizing the future costs of the spending cuts. So, today’s government can 
reduce spending of future governments, by committing future tax revenues to debt 
service. But the incumbent can also limit its opponent chances of reelection by 
deliberately creating ineffectiveness. 
This strategic interaction will lead to deficits even though a social planner who 
maximizes the weighted average of utilities of the two groups would choose to 
balance the budget in every period. The more polarized are the two groups’ 
preferences on the composition of public spending and the more unlikely is that 
today’s government will be reelected, the larger will be the amount of borrowing of 
today’s government. 
Persson and Svensson (1989) find, however, that the level of government spending is 
questionable. They consider a conservative government and a liberal or a left-wing   13
government. The conservative government wants a lower amount of spending than the 
liberal. Suppose that the conservative government is certain to be replaced by its 
opponent in the next election. Then the conservative government faces a trade-off 
between distortionary taxes and debt. It is assumed that the only way to raise money 
for government spending is through a distortionary tax. By lowering taxes and issuing 
debt, the conservative government constrains future spending. However this creates a 
suboptimal distribution of tax distortions since the taxes today are too low, which 
implies that future taxes are going to be too high when the debt becomes due. If the 
conservative government puts more weight on reaching its preferred level of spending 
than on the welfare cost of a distorted tax profile over time, it will issue more debt 
than the successor would prefer. On the other hand, the left-wing government has 
exactly the opposite incentive. By raising taxes and reducing debt, it creates surpluses 
to encourage increases in future spending decisions. 
In both contexts, public debt plays a role in linking the various governments. The 
more priority the current government gives to current spending, that is, the less it 
internalizes the costs of current spending, the larger this conflict will be. The same 
happens, the more electoral uncertainty there is. This political explanation of budget 
deficits relies on different preferences among different parties in office and on 
alternation of the parties in office. 
These models suffer from the problem that public debt does not commit future 
governments if the latter can default. The costs of default imply a constraint on the 
current government’s ability to issue debt: at most, today’s government can issue an 
amount of debt that makes the next government indifferent between defaulting and 
serving the debt. 
The two approaches have different empirical implications concerning debt. Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) predict that there is a deficit bias irrespective of the incumbent's 
political ideology, while Persson and Svensson (1989) predict that only the right-wing 
government should issue debt whereas the left-wing government should leave a 
surplus. Nevertheless, both models predict that the strategic use of deficits or 
surpluses are larger, the greater the disagreement between different policy-makers and 
the more likely that the current government will be replaced. And, in fact, the 1970’s 
and the 1980’s have witnessed much more frequent changes of government from left   14
to right and vice-versa than previous decades and it is possible that political and 
economic instability were connected. Some tests also support the relation between 
high-debt countries and more polarized political parties and electorate. Therefore, 
these models are testable and can provide answers to the questions addressed above. 
So far, the major problem these models present, despite some evidence, is the need of 
conducting more rigorous empirical tests (Alesina et al, 1997). 
Models of redistribution conflicts 
Models of intergenerational redistribution are a special case of this type of models. As 
in the strategic use of debt, the assumption of an infinite temporal horizon is also 
relaxed. The intertemporal nature of fiscal decisions creates links across generations. 
If each generation cares enough about its offspring, the finite horizon of each 
generation is immaterial. 
However, these models emphasize the fact that public debt can redistribute the tax 
burden across generations. For example, by increasing debt today, the current 
generation can make the tax burden heavier to future generation. The current 
generation has a political advantage over future generations as it can vote and choose 
current policy while future voters cannot. Therefore, a selfish generation could vote 
for policies that shift the burden of taxation to future generations. However, this 
behavior is limited by intergenerational altruism: present generations care about 
future generations. 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) present a particular model of intergenerational 
redistribution. This model assumes that in the present generation there are rich and 
poor parents. The rich parents are those who leave positive bequests to the future 
generation and for whom debt policy is indifferent because they can compensate any 
change in current taxes and deficits with adjustments in their bequests. Poor parents 
are those who would like to run government deficits and so, indirectly, borrow from 
future generations. Therefore, rich parents are indifferent to debt policies while poor 
ones favor public debt. The result is that the social choice is likely to lead to debt as 
society usually mainly consists of poor people. 
Other contributions suggest that intergenerational redistribution interplay with 
intragenerational redistribution. A choice of default redistributes from debt holders to   15
taxpayers, that is, from the old to the young and from the rich, who hold the debt, to 
the poor, who do not (Alesina and Perotti, 1995).  
Persson and Tabellini (1999) focus on redistributive programs and, in particular, how 
voters’ preferences shape these programs. They emphasize both intergenerational and 
intragenerational redistribution and present six possible conflicts. 
In the case of a conflict between young and old individuals, there are two dimensions 
of heterogeneity (income and age). Voters’ preferences over the generosity of the 
pension system are systematically related to their age as well as their income, that is, 
public pensions redistribute both across and within generations. The study shows that 
poor and elderly voters support large public pensions and the size of social security 
exceeds the social optimum because future generations of tax payers cannot 
participate in the voting. This explains why pension expenditures have been growing 
so rapidly. 
In a situation of redistribution between rich and poor, Persson and Tabellini (1999) 
assume that heterogeneity is one-dimensional (income) and voters’ preferences over a 
general income tax are monotonically related to their own productivity. The analysis 
is on the influence of political forces on the observed growth of social transfers over 
time as well as on the cross-country differences in the size of these transfers. The 
authors show that the size of redistributive programs increase with a specific measure 
of pre-tax income inequality. 
A third conflict concerns employed and unemployed individuals. In this case, voters’ 
preferences are shaped by the risk of becoming unemployed over the generosity of 
unemployment insurance and the structure of other market labor programs. There are 
income risks that should be insured - it is the case of unemployment insurance and 
public health insurance. Redistributive transfers programs play a major role in 
providing this type of insurance. So, voters evaluate these programs not only on the 
basis of their relative income but also based on their relative risk. However, the 
distribution of risk among individuals is also determined by government regulation on 
the labor market. The powerful majority of individuals with stable working conditions 
tend to support an over-regulated labor market and under-provision of unemployment 
insurance. Therefore, political equilibrium is characterized by low unemployment 
insurance and high restrictive labor market regulations.   16
This analysis can be extended to the conflict of redistribution between “insiders” and 
“outsiders”. The first are those with a well paid and protected job and the second are 
those who are either unemployed or in secondary labor markets. In this specification, 
the risk of future unemployment is lower for currently employed individuals who 
therefore want less unemployment insurance than the “outsiders”. “Insiders” prefer 
instead protections against unemployment even if those restrictions lead to more 
unemployment. 
The fourth conflict mentioned is a regional one. In this case, individuals belong to two 
different regions, which have different average incomes. Regions are rich or poor 
accordingly to their natural resources endowments, their occupational composition, 
their cultural and sociological attributes or by historical reasons. Programs 
redistributing across individuals also redistribute across regions. But regions, unlike 
individuals, have the option to opt out of a redistributive program or joint it through 
integration. Redistributive gains may induce poor regions to seek integration with 
richer regions or regional conflict may lead to secession. However, there are other 
factors influencing integration or secession decisions such as cultural values and 
economies of scale in the provision of public goods. 
In the fifth problem mentioned, the analysis concerns the conflict between labor and 
capital. It is about how the allocation of tax burden between these inputs is 
determined. Voters’ preferences over the structure of the tax system depend on the 
relative importance of these two tax bases in their income. According to basic 
principles of optimal taxation, labor should be taxed more than capital because capital 
is a more elastic tax base. However, the taxes on capital are higher than what is social 
optimum, in equilibrium, since capital income is more concentrated and a majority of 
voters primarily rely on income from labor. 
Finally, Persson and Tabellini (1999) add another source of redistribution conflict: 
between organized groups and non-organized groups. Many economic policy 
decisions create concentrated benefits for a few well-defined groups with the cost 
diffused in society at large. Whenever economic policies benefit narrowly defined 
special interests, the political incentives to influence the design of such policies are 
much stronger for the beneficiary than for the majority bearing the cost. Public choice 
literature has emphasized the approach that assumes that beneficiaries are more likely   17
to get organized, due to their higher stakes in the various programs, while the interests 
of the unorganized general public tend to be neglected. 
The authors also survey the literature that has focused on structural models of the 
political process, trying to identify specific features of the political system that confer 
some power to some groups rather than others or specific features that entail 
systematic biases in aggregate spending. In order to predict which political groups are 
most powerful in the search for benefits, the institutional details of the policy process 
have to be specified. But it is also important to analyze the effect of alternative 
institutions on the overall size of government. Interest groups may get organized into 
lobbies and be represented by powerful legislators giving them an advantage in the 
fight for policy benefits. Or they may have particular attributes as voters, which make 
them an attractive target for office-motivated politicians. Groups organized as a lobby 
have disproportionate influence on the final allocation, which generally result in 
suboptimal allocations. If taxpayers are less politically organized than the 
beneficiaries of the spending programs, because they have smaller stakes individually, 
a large government emerges. 
These conflicts, however, are present everywhere and so these models do not help to 
explain public debt differences between countries. For instance, it is not fully 
acceptable that intergenerational altruism is stronger in certain countries than it is in 
others. 
Furthermore, this theory does not explain why only in recent decades there has been a 
clear accumulation of budget deficits. Note that if growth is increasing, then it might 
make sense for the current generation to shift the tax burden to the next one. 
However, growth has, if anything, been decreasing in industrialized countries, in 
particular OECD countries, in the last decades. 
Models of conflicts among political parties 
The theoretical models that focus on disagreement among agents in the decision-
making process are perhaps the ones that have received more attention from the 
empirical literature. They are based on the conflict among policy-makers or parties 
that have influence on budgetary decisions, at the same time. The deeper the conflicts 
among such agents, the greater the difficulties encountered when reducing budget   18
deficits. Such policy conflicts are more prominent in countries with coalition 
governments and, in this case, the concern is about the polarization of parties that are 
members of the same coalition government. Game theory suggests that cooperation is 
more difficult when the number of players is large. In this view, coalition 
governments will find it more difficult to reduce budget deficits after adverse shocks, 
since parties in the coalition will veto spending cuts or tax increases that go against 
the interests of their respective constituencies. 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) have stressed that governments do not have full control of 
available policy instruments and manage them according to some well-defined 
objective function. Central in the reasoning of these authors is that politicians have 
limited ability to achieve agreements among coalition parties within a given 
government. First, individual parties in the coalition have different constituencies. In 
response to an adverse shock, each party only proposes budget cuts, which do not 
negatively affect its own constituency. Second, individual coalition members have a 
veto. Each party has enormous power to block a proposal of another coalition 
member, but at the same time it has only little power to implement its own program. 
Third, there are weak enforcement mechanisms among coalition partners in reaching 
the co-operative outcome. Coalition parties know that the electorate is not able to 
discern which party is responsible for which part of policy. Lack of monitoring 
weakens the enforcement mechanisms. 
There is an additional reason why coalition governments may have more difficulties 
to keep budgets in line. Enforcement mechanisms among coalitions will also be very 
weak because they generally have a high turnover rate. A short tenure will limit the 
possibilities to play the repeated decision-making game. The parties’ incentives to co-
operate are therefore reduced. So, in this argument, it is not the number of players that 
is crucial, but the instability of the government. Clearly, this argument takes it for 
granted that coalition governments have a shorter tenure than have one-party, 
majoritarian governments. 
In this context, Alesina and Drazen (1991) proposed a model, “war of attrition 
model”, of delayed fiscal adjustments in which different sociopolitical groups fight 
about the distribution of the fiscal burden. The model assumes that an initial 
exogenous permanent fiscal shock creates budget deficits, at the existing tax rates,   19
and debt begins to accumulate. A social planner would react immediately to the shock 
by raising tax revenues to balance the budget. If there are, instead, two political 
parties in office, they have to agree on a fiscal policy, that is, they must agree on how 
to share the fiscal burden of stabilization. The longer it takes, the more the debt 
accumulates and the longer the fiscal distortions persist. An immediate agreement on 
how to share the fiscal burden of stabilization makes both groups better off relative to 
the same agreement reached with delay. 
Nevertheless, a rational stabilization delay can occur either if one of the groups has to 
bear a disproportionate share of the fiscal burden or when the two groups are not 
informed about how costly it is for the opponent to postpone the fiscal stabilization. 
The first situation emphasizes the economic costs (of preventing the other group from 
imposing an undesirable fiscal policy) and the second the political ones (lobbying and 
direct political actions). So, they are not mutually exclusive. 
As none of the groups wants to pay the larger share of the fiscal stabilization, the 
optimal concession time is determined by equating the marginal cost of waiting 
(which is the utility cost of living another instant in the distorted economy) with the 
marginal benefit of waiting (which is given by the conditional probability that the 
other group will concede in the next instant multiplied by the difference between 
paying the lower or the higher share of the fiscal burden). 
So, the point of the model is that the distributional conflict among social groups 
delays the adoption of the efficient policy of balancing the budget. And when it 
appears it is partly financed by external debt accumulation and partly by some sort of 
distortionary taxation. Stabilization is defined as a change of policy that stabilizes 
debt-to-GNP ratio and substitutes previous taxation with a less distortionary form of 
taxation. The more unequal is the burden of stabilization, which may be an indicator 
of political polarization, the higher are the benefits from waiting and so the later is the 
expected time of stabilization. 
In opposition to a coalition government where the “war of attrition” can delay 
stabilization measures, a single-party government can lead to an excessive reaction in 
order to reach stabilization because it has the power to protect its supporting 
constituency from a heavy fiscal burden. Therefore, there may be a trade-off between   20
the relative inaction of coalition governments and the partisan overreaction of 
majority single-party governments (Alesina et al, 1997). 
Hahm (1996) suggested an empirical refinement to this analysis. This author 
differentiates between three political systems: presidential, stable parliamentary and 
unstable parliamentary. According to Hahm’s theoretical model, the Roubini-Sachs 
approach is valid only in unstable parliamentary systems, but in the other systems the 
relationship between strength of government and fiscal position is different. In a 
stable parliamentary system, the strength of the government is hypothesized to have 
no systematic effect on the deficit and, in a presidential regime, if the party in power 
is strong, there is a tendency for increases in the deficit. Hahm reports evidence 
supporting this view. 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) present another model of conflicts among political 
parties based on the importance of “swing-voters” on the choice of the electoral 
platforms by two parties who maximize the probability of winning the election. They 
make binding promises of policy favors to interest groups ahead the election. The two 
candidates are not identical and different voters have ideological preferences for one 
or the other. When choosing which party to support, voters trade-off their 
predetermined ideological party preferences against the announced economic benefits. 
Political power reflects the distribution of voters’ ideological preferences across 
groups; however, more powerful groups include a large number of “swing-voters” - 
voters who move across parties because they do not care about ideology. To win the 
election, both parties tend to direct economic benefits towards these voters. 
Although these models are suitable for the explanation of why countries delay 
adjustments, they do not explain the cause of the shocks that originate the fiscal 
budget. On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that weak coalition governments 
have delayed fiscal adjustments and have accumulated debt. Moreover, it has been 
shown that the higher the number of parties in a coalition government, the higher is 
public debt and that longer-lived government are associated to smaller deficits 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995). As coalitions have, in general, shorter lives and the nature 
of party systems and of government structure depend on the electoral system, it is 
possible to establish a relationship between the type of political system and public 
debt. These models have found large support from empirical evidence.   21
Models of geographically dispersed interests 
These models emphasize the interaction between the organization of legislatures and 
fiscal decisions. The argument is that political representatives of geographically-based 
constituencies overestimate the benefits of public expenditure in their region relating 
to their financing costs because these costs are borne by all the taxpayers and not only 
by those living in that region (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina et al, 1997, and 
Imbeau and Chenard, 2001). The overestimation of these benefits leads to a level of 
government spending over the optimal one. The local authorities or the 
geographically elected representatives do not fully internalize the effects of their 
decisions over the aggregate budget. The incentives for the local authorities are 
different if they are responsible for both the tax and spending decisions. 
The main idea of these models is that the geographical distribution of costs, benefits 
and decision power are important factors in explaining aggregate deficit. 
Even though these models can help to explain the size of government spending and 
therefore the size of the budget, they fail to explain the intertemporal allocation of 
taxes and expenditures and therefore budget balances because they are static models. 
Moreover, they focus on the public expenses that are geographically based which are 
not necessarily those which have grown more in recent years. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) mention there is evidence that there has been an increase in 
the fiscal responsibilities of local authorities. However, according to the authors, more 
research has to be done in order to find out if this kind of cross-country and temporal 
variations can explain budget deficits because these models have not yet been 
sufficiently tested. 
Models of budgetary institutions 
Models emphasizing the preferences of politicians and voters do not explain all the 
cross-country and cross-temporal variations of public deficit and debt. The models 
emphasizing the role of institutions offer an alternative explanation for the differences 
found in public deficit and debt, as these institutions vary considerably across 
countries and time. 
Budgetary institutions encompass all the laws, regulations and rules according to 
which budgets are drafted, approved, implemented and evaluated. They have an effect   22
on fiscal policy outcomes if two conditions hold: first, if they are more difficult to 
change than the budget law itself and, second, if they influence the final vote and the 
implementation of the budget. In fact, budget institutions cannot be changed as 
frequently as the budget itself otherwise they would be ineffective. According to 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), whether or not budget institutions affect the outcome of a 
legislative vote is still being discussed by political science. Different types of 
budgetary institutions have been identified by the literature: formal laws, voting rules 
and procedures and the degree of transparency of the budget document. 
First, formal laws establish fiscal constraints such us balanced budget laws or other 
restrictions that affect the choices concerning fiscal policy - these regulations usually 
lead to lower average deficits and to quick responses to shocks. 
Among the voting rules or procedures in the formulation of a budget proposal within 
the executive as well as in the presentation and approval of the budget in the 
legislature, two issues have been emphasized: the type and timing of parliamentary 
votes and the rules concerning the limits, or the lack of them, to parliamentary 
amendments to the budget. Over time, these institutions have been shaped by social, 
political and historical facts, but growing deficits and debts, in recent decades, have 
led to the re-examination of what can be done in this context to promote fiscal 
discipline without loosing the flexible use of the budget as a fiscal tool. 
As for the type and timing of parliamentary votes, the general idea is that voting first 
on the aggregate size of the budget and then on the allocation of spending programs 
leads to more budget discipline, although there are some arguments that do not 
support this view (Alesina et al, 1997). 
As for amendments rules, they might be distinguished between closed rules and open 
rules. A closed rule is one in which the legislature must vote immediately either for or 
against the proposal made by a member of the legislature. If it is accepted, the budget 
is approved; if it is rejected, another proposal can be made and voted. These rules lead 
to the allocation of the benefits to a majoritarian fraction of the legislature and limit 
the legislature’s prerogatives to amend the executive’s proposal. An open rule is one 
in which the proposal made by the member selected can be asked for a vote by 
another selected member or this other member can propose an amendment. In this last 
case, the amendment is balloted against the proposal and then a new member is   23
selected and so forth. These rules delay the approval of a proposal but the distribution 
of the benefits within the winning majority is more egalitarian than with a closed rule 
(Alesina et al, 1997). 
Political power reflects the assignment of agenda setting or amendment rights. 
Institutions that centralize decision-making power, in particular budgetary power, by 
conferring strong proposal rights and limiting amendments on spending proposals 
seem to promote more fiscal discipline and induce a small size of government but 
distort allocation in favor of those who hold such powers (Persson and Tabellini, 
1999). 
The third type of institution is the degree of transparency of the budget document and 
the amount of flexibility in the implementation process. Politicians have no incentives 
to produce transparent budgets for two reasons: voters’ illusion and, in the rational 
voters framework, the advantage policy-makers can retain over not fully informed 
voters. Facing naïve voters, opportunistic policy-makers can engage in preelectoral 
fiscal manipulation based on less transparent budgets procedures and documents. This 
is possible because naïve voters tend to overestimate the benefits of public spending 
and underestimate current and future tax burdens. Therefore, opportunist decision-
makers are able to favor one lobby group or another. Even under rational behavior 
with not fully informed voters, by making it less clear how fiscal policies translate 
into outcomes, policy-makers are able to conduct electoralistic measures that may 
lead to opportunistic cycles. This informational disadvantage would disappear with 
transparent procedures. 
In summary, as policy outcomes are influenced by politico-institutional variables, in 
order to improve policy-making, the intervention must also be made at the 
institutional level. There are mainly two types of institutional reforms: changes in the 
legislation regarding the budget formation and more general institutional reforms such 
as electoral laws. 
The introduction of regulations that limit the discretion of each government in 
running deficits, or more specifically, a balanced budget law is the most commonly 
referred reform of the budget process. The costs of a balanced budget law are the loss 
of flexibility and of fiscal stabilization over the cycle. Moreover, the enforceability of 
a balanced budget law is also a problem.   24
Therefore, the choice of the budget procedure is based on a trade-off: the more 
difficult it is to change the law, the more credible are the commitments but the less 
flexible it is and so the more difficult it is to respond to unforeseen shocks. The same 
happens with the size of the majority needed to break the rule: the bigger it is, the 
more credible but less flexible is the budget process. 
An important issue is who exercises power in the budget process. At the executive 
level, there are two models: a hierarchical one in which key ministers exercise 
considerable power and a collegial model in which power is more equally distributed. 
The effect of intragovernmental conflicts is reduced, and therefore fiscal discipline 
increases, if either the prime-minister or the finance minister has a strong role in the 
budget formation process because spending ministers are more likely to be sensitive 
to special interest pressures while the former are more sensitive to the overall size and 
financing of the budget. At the legislative level, procedures that impose first a vote on 
the size of total spending and then a discussion of specific items are more likely to 
limit deficits because it avoids the increase in the deficit as a way to solve conflicting 
spending needs. Finally, independent central banks may enforce fiscal responsibility 
by limiting government’s access to monetary finance. 
These models have been mainly developed for the USA and have been more oriented 
to explaining the size of the government rather than the intertemporal allocation of 
taxation and spending. However, empirical research has found evidence that 
budgetary institutions influence fiscal policies. An obvious example is the European 
Stability and Growth Pact (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). Moreover, the great 
variety of these institutions among countries can help explaining cross-country 
differences in public debt but the fact that they are relatively stable overtime makes it 
more difficult to explain the temporal performances of public debt. 
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON POLITICAL MODELS OF BUDGET DEFICITS 
Public choice researchers have not limited their work to theoretical developments on 
deficits and debts; they have also deducted hypothesis in order to empirically test their 
theories. This section presents some of the most recent empirical evidence on political 
models of budget deficits. Although it is not a complete survey, it intends to reflect 
the empirical results that dominate the most recent economic literature and, therefore, 
to assess the validity of the various models. The results are summarized in Table 3 in   25
the Appendix. This table highlights the fact that it is not possible to draw a line 
separating the various models, as there are many points of contact between them. 
As for both the models of fiscal illusion and the models of geographical dispersed 
interests there has not been a significant empirical exploration for the reasons 
mentioned in the previous section. The models of redistribution conflicts, due to their 
complexity that goes beyond the scope of this work, will be left out of this section. 
Empirical evidence on the other models is surveyed next. 
Debt as a strategic variable 
The models that focus on the strategic use of debt have been largely analyzed. 
Pettersson (2001) provides a recent empirical study on the strategic debt behavior as a 
political-economic explanation for the accumulation of large government debts in 
many countries in the last 20 years. Furthermore, his paper tries to make a direct test 
of strategic debt behavior by generating predictors of the expectation of electoral 
defeat from an auxiliary model and by discriminating between the two main theories 
of strategic debt behavior mentioned in Section 4: Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and 
Persson and Svensson (1989). 
According to the author, previous empirical studies have either rejected the strategic 
explanation of debt or have not been able to isolate this effect; he mentions four 
empirical studies. Grilli et al (1991) use data from a sample of the OECD countries 
and find that short government durability plays a crucial role in explaining public 
deficits and debt. However, this study cannot discriminate if this is due to the strategic 
reason or to government weakness. Crain and Tollison (1993) develop an empirical 
analysis on USA data from 1969 to 1989 and the results indicate that legislature 
stability and executive terms limits are correlated with less volatility of budget 
deficits/surpluses. This finding is interpreted as consistent with strategic debt 
behavior, but it is not obvious that this is the right conclusion to draw since there are 
two competing strategic debt models and only one of them necessarily predict less 
volatility. Franzese (2001) is also unable to find any effects of strategic debt behavior 
on a panel of OECD countries. Lambertini (2003) using USA and OECD pooled data 
finds little evidence of strategic use of debt.   26
Pettersson (2001) argues that these findings are not that surprising since there are 
several potential difficulties using USA (related to the scarcity of observations from 
elections) or OECD (due to sample heterogeneity
4) data to test the strategic behavior 
approach. To overcome these problems, the author used a panel data set from Swedish 
local governments, which, according to the author, meet the required autonomy so 
that strategic debt theories are applicable. The main advantages of this panel data set 
are the homogeneity of the sample (same political system, elections held at fixed 
intervals of time, highly comparable measures of debt) and the large number of 
observations from elections (about 2000). 
The main findings of Pettersson’s (2001) paper strongly suggest that a right-wing 
government accumulates more debt during its term of office if it thinks that it will be 
defeated as compared to when it expects to remain in office. On the other hand, a left-
wing government decreases the level of debt the higher the possibility of its defeat. 
Moreover, the larger the inherited debt, the more a newly elected government has to 
reduce spending and raise taxes. These results are consistent with the predictions from 
the model developed by Persson and Svensson (1989). According to their model, the 
inherited debt should affect a newly elected government's decision on taxation and 
spending. A high debt forces the new government to decrease spending and raise 
taxes. Moreover, all regressions illustrate the same principle: a left-wing party, on 
average, reduces the level of debt while a right-wing party does the opposite, the 
higher the probability of defeat. 
Pettersson (2001) also concludes that the frequency of government changes has no 
significant impact on the accumulation of debt (the sign of the coefficient is also 
opposite from what would be expected). Thus, this result confirms the previous 
findings that the two political blocs have opposite incentives regarding the strategic 
use of debt. Furthermore, it shows that it can be very misleading to use the frequency 
of government changes to infer strategic debt behavior. The author also finds a 
negative relationship between inherited debt and change in spending and a positive 
                                                     
4 The problem of heterogeneity concerns, on one hand, how to get comparable measures of the 
incumbent's expectation of electoral defeat proxies since the OECD countries differ, among other 
things, with respect to electoral system (presidential or parliamentary) and type of election (election 
occurrence is fixed or flexible). On the other hand, it concerns the exercise of constructing primary 
deficits free of the effects of the business cycle variations, since one needs to separate the business   27
relationship between inherited debt and taxes. Overall, Pettersson’s results strongly 
support the strategic explanation suggested by Persson and Svensson (1989). 
Conflicts among political parties 
In an empirical study which address this issue, Roubini and Sachs (1989) use a 
variable to identify the type of government in power, in order to explain the growth of 
government debt in a sample of OECD countries. These authors find that broad 
coalition governments experienced higher deficits, other things being equal, than did 
one-party, majoritarian governments. However, subsequent research found less 
support for this so-called weak government hypothesis. Ohlsson and Edin (1991) 
argue, for instance, that the political cohesion variable used by Roubini and Sachs 
captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition 
governments. De Haan and Sturm’s (1997) paper reinforces the idea that the Roubini-
Sachs power dispersion index appears to contain some errors. 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) have broadened this approach by arguing that the 
previous literature overlooked what they call size fragmentation. One possible source 
of fragmentation of fiscal policy-making is the number of decision-makers. The larger 
the number of decision-makers, the less each will internalize the costs that a certain 
policy will impose on others. It can be argued that the relevant group here is each 
political party in government. The authors present new estimates for a broad sample 
of 21 OECD countries, for the period 1979–1995, to investigate whether political and 
institutional characteristics of policy mechanisms can explain cross-country 
differences in fiscal policy outcomes. In sharp contrast with previous findings of 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Ohlsson and Edin (1991), the authors find that growth 
of government debt is not associated with the power dispersion index of Roubini and 
Sachs, nor with the variant suggested by Ohlsson and Edin. This conclusion is 
reached no matter which concept of government debt is used: gross or net general 
government debt or central government debt. Also, if one distinguishes between 
stable and unstable representative regimes, one does not find any effect of the type of 
government on fiscal policies pursued. 
                                                                                                                                                     
cycle component from the strategic component (if there is one), to assess the role of strategic debt 
behavior.   28
This result therefore does not corroborate Hahm’s (1996) findings, whose empirical 
analysis provided mixed support for the work of Roubini and Sachs (1989). Hahm 
reports evidence supporting the view that the Roubini-Sachs approach is valid only in 
unstable parliamentary systems. 
Spolaore (2003) develops a political-economy model of adjustment in alternative 
systems of government. He finds that the degree of political fragmentation in society 
(the number of political agents with conflicting interests over adjustment policies) 
plays a fundamental role in the dynamics of adjustment within each system and in 
their relative performance. The results are consistent with empirical work that relates 
delayed stabilizations in coalition governments to the number of parties within the 
coalition. Alesina and Perotti (1995) also found that coalition governments are less 
likely to introduce successful fiscal adjustment measures. 
De Haan and Sturm (1994) concluded that the growth of government debt is 
positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to budget 
procedures (empirical evidence on models of budgetary institutions is presented 
below). This implies that countries with more unstable governments may have more 
difficulties to control their public debt. But, introducing tight fiscal criteria may 
compensate the internal political instability. Furthermore, in countries with left-wing 
governments, the growth of the share of government spending in total output 
generally tends to be higher.  
Another paper (De Haan et al, 1999) shows new evidence on the hypothesis that 
coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an 
adverse economic shock than do one-party, majoritarian governments. The estimates 
are based on a broad sample of OECD countries, for the period 1979–1995. Using 
various specifications as suggested in the literature, the authors do not find evidence 
that the type of government affects cross-country variation in fiscal policy. 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) explore on a panel of 19 OECD countries the role of 
fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970-95 period. Fragmentation 
of fiscal policy-making is empirically measured by the number of decision-makers 
and the rules of he budget process. The authors test these determinants against each 
other and against ideology and show that cabinet size (the number of ministers) and to   29
a less extent, coalition size (the number of political parties in a coalition) and 
ideology affect fiscal policy outcomes. 
Volkerink and De Hann (2001) extend the literature in a number of ways. First, they 
notice that one serious shortcoming of most previous empirical work in this line of 
research is that the data used refers to general government, whereas the theoretical 
notions that underlie the estimates usually refer to central government. Second, other 
theoretical hypotheses, besides size fragmentation, are analyzed: the government’s 
position  vis-à-vis parliament, the ideological complexion of government and the 
political fragmentation of government. 
The results on the size fragmentation of government analysis suggest that the effective 
number of parties as well as the number of spending ministers affect the budget deficit 
of central government but the impact of the latter is stronger and more robust than the 
effective number of parties in government. The results suggest that the effective 
number of parties in parliament also affects the budget deficit: the more fragmented 
parliament is, the higher is the central government’s budget deficit; this is, in fact, the 
most robust influence the authors found. Moreover, the more politically divided 
parliament is, the less government may have to fear from the opposition. The results 
on ideological complexion of government analysis suggest that left-wing governments 
do not to have higher deficits than right-wing governments. This indicates that even 
though left-wing governments spend more, they also tax more, so the balance is not 
affected. The political fragmentation of government is the degree to which political 
parties in the coalition have different ideologies and the ideological coherence of a 
cabinet may matter for fiscal policy outcomes as well. The results, however, do not 
support the hypothesis that large ideological differences will make compromising 
more difficult. 
Budgetary institutions 
Finally, we will focus on the models of budgetary institutions. Kirchgaessner (2001) 
provides a survey on the empirical research on fiscal institutions of the last three 
decades. The main results are the following.  
Balanced-budget rules and limitations of expenditure, taxes and deficits have in most 
cases proved to be effective in cutting down public expenditure, revenue and debt.   30
However, at least in some cases this leads to a deterioration of the quality of the 
publicly provided services, especially with respect to schooling. Budgetary 
procedures matter and the interaction between budgetary procedures and the electoral 
system also matters: not all budgetary procedures have the same effect in all electoral 
systems. They might be less effective than constitutional or statutory balanced-budget 
or tax and expenditure limitation rules but, in a situation where it is impossible to 
introduce such rules, they might show a feasible second-best way to reach fiscal 
sustainability. A “first-best solution” might be to give the citizens direct political 
rights in the budgetary process. Citizens demand fewer public services and seem to 
force a sounder fiscal policy in systems with direct legislation than in purely 
parliamentary systems. This results in a lower public debt per capita under direct 
democracy. Finally, there is some evidence that fiscal federalism leads, ceteris 
paribus, to a smaller size of the government. There are also political institutions, 
which have an impact on the public budgets, and there are some interactions between 
the different institutions. 
Kirchgaessner (2001) adds that, besides fiscal institutions and besides political factors 
like the ideology of the leading party of the government or the number of parties in a 
coalition, there are also political institutions that can have a considerable impact. At 
least two of them have also been discussed in the literature to a large extent and in 
recent years there has also been some empirical research in this respect. One question 
is about the impact a presidential system on public finance compared to a 
parliamentary system as most European countries have. The second question relates to 
the electoral system: majoritarian versus proportional electoral system. 
According to the author, there are two major problems with the hypothesis that 
presidential regimes lead to a lower size of the government than parliamentary 
regimes and that majoritarian elections lead to a lower size of the government than 
proportional elections. First, it uses only the size of the central government as 
dependent variable. One reason for this might be that the political data used as 
explanatory variables is also from the federal level. These results are, however, hardly 
indicating anything about the total size of the government because they do not control 
for the different fiscal structures. Second, the characterization of the different 
countries as “presidential” or “parliamentarian” is highly debatable. This demands for   31
further investigations of the impact these political institutions have on the budgetary 
process. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) consists in a real example of rules and 
procedures aiming at fiscal discipline. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) review the 
reasons that have been advanced in favour of SGP. These arguments can be 
summarized as follows: the elimination of inflationary pressure and, in particular, the 
prevention of inflationary debt bailouts, the offsetting of Europe’s political bias 
toward excessive deficits, the internalization of the cross-border interest rate 
spillovers, the encouragement of policy coordination in an integrated Europe. 
Although, according to the authors, the SGP will have some effect on fiscal outcomes, 
they alert for the fact that it might also have significant costs, by reducing the extent 
of automatic stabilization and by diverting political effort from more fundamental 
problems. Alternative procedures and rules are suggested: for instance, prudential 
limits on banks’ exposure to public debts in order to reduce the risk of bank crisis 
following a government’s failure to service its debt (one of the major rationales for 
the SGP). Wyplosz (2002) also offers a critical analysis of the SGP and suggests 
alternative ways to achieve the desired goals.  
Following Kirchgaessner (2001), the main conclusion is that a prudent combination of 
institutions can help to reduce public deficits and debt. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Economic literature on the explanation of public deficits has focused on two main 
issues: the accumulation of public debts in recent decades and the large observed 
cross-countries differences on public deficits and debt. Economic arguments alone are 
not sufficient to explain this behavior. To overcome this caveat, recent political 
economy literature emphasizes the role of political and institutional factors in the 
explanation of the fiscal policy and, in particular, of the budget balances behavior. 
The present survey focuses on a set of political-economic models. 
The review made suggests a distinction between two blocks of models: those that 
have been analyzed by the theoretical literature but have not been a strong concern of 
the empirical works and those that, besides having been developed under a theoretical 
perspective, have also been empirically largely assessed. Models of redistribution 
conflicts have not been considered in the empirical review due to their complexity.   32
Models based upon opportunistic policy-makers and naïve voters with fiscal illusion, 
models based upon the assumption of ideological policy-makers and models of 
geographically dispersed interests constitute the first block. 
Models based upon the idea of fiscal illusion have been largely criticized as they can 
help explaining short-run fluctuations in budget deficits but not public debt long-run 
behavior, nor the observed differences across industrialized countries. The partisan 
cycles theory may help to explain some cross-country differences but does not help to 
explain the generalized observed public debt accumulation. The models of 
geographical dispersed interests can help to explain the size of government spending, 
but they fail to explain the intertemporal allocation of taxes and expenditures and 
therefore budget deficits because they are static models. They also focus on the public 
expenses that are geographically based which are not necessarily those which have 
grown more in recent years.  
The other block gathers the models of the strategic use of debt, of conflicts among 
political parties and of budgetary institutions. 
Both approaches of debt as a strategic variable argue that political polarization and 
frequent government changes should be associated with larger debts. And, in fact, 
recent decades have witnessed much more frequent changes of government from left 
to right and vice-versa than previous decades and it is possible that political and 
economic instability were connected. These models are testable and can provide 
answers to the questions addressed above. So far, the major problem of these models 
is the need of more robust empirical tests. The models of conflicts among political 
parties are perhaps those that have received more attention from the empirical 
literature. These models have found some support from empirical evidence. In fact, 
there is empirical support for the fact that higher public deficits and debts are 
positively correlated to coalition governments, to the frequency of government 
changes, to the number of parties in government, to the number of spending ministers 
and to the number of parties in parliament. These two last types of theoretical models 
have some empirical consequences in common. In fact, they both rely on the 
correlation between higher public deficits and debts, on one hand, and frequent 
government changes and political polarization, on the other hand.   33
The last type of models emphasizes the role of budgetary institutions. There is 
empirical evidence that the strength of the position of the prime-minister (or finance 
minister) in intragovernmental negotiations, the existence of balanced-budget rules, 
the type and timing of parliamentary votes and the rules concerning the limits to 
parliamentary amendments to the budget are important in controlling budget deficits. 
Direct democracy and fiscal federalism also promote fiscal discipline. 
This survey has made clear that empirical investigation on political models of budget 
deficits has focused, particularly, on the models of the strategic use of debt, of 
conflicts among political parties and of budgetary institutions. However, even in these 
cases, empirical literature has always not been conclusive. This literature review has 
put forward the need of testing alternative methods as well as specifications, based on 
larger samples, both in time and countries, and on more reliable data. These empirical 
refinements would be interesting areas for future research. There is also scope for a 
more comprehensive empirical analysis of the relative importance of the various 
theoretical explanations. 
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Table 1: Gross Government Debt, % GDP   







1970 - 18,9 63,2 54,1 - - - 17,5 17,6 - 37,9 10,5 49,4 41,8 18,7 - 30,4 78,0 49,2 27,3
1971 - 17,8 62,4 55,2 - - - 17,7 18,1 - 42,8 11,7 47,2 41,8 18,4 - 30,2 74,6 49,8 27,9
1972 - 17,2 62,1 53,4 - - - 17,9 19,1 - 49,1 15,5 44,2 42,4 17,2 - 29,6 69,4 48,2 28,7
1973 - 17,2 59,9 47,9 - - - 16,6 16,1 - 51,1 15,1 41,1 41,0 15,9 - 28,8 65,0 45,4 27,9
1974 - 17,1 56,0 45,7 - - - 17,7 16,7 53,8 51,4 15,9 39,2 38,5 15,6 - 30,1 65,3 44,5 28,0
1975 - 23,1 57,6 45,1 - - - 23,1 18,5 59,5 57,4 20,1 40,2 39,8 22,6 - 29,5 62,1 48,0 31,2
1976 - 26,3 58,2 43,5 - - - 25,4 18,3 63,8 56,3 25,7 39,7 41,6 27,5 13,0 27,2 61,7 48,1 31,8
1977 - 28,6 61,6 45,0 - - 29,1 27,1 18,5 60,9 56,2 30,7 39,2 47,5 28,8 14,0 28,7 60,6 46,9 32,8
1978 - 32,3 65,1 47,9 - - 30,2 28,1 24,3 62,8 61,3 38,8 40,5 53,5 32,3 13,8 32,8 58,1 45,8 34,7
1979 - 34,2 68,1 45,1 - - 30,5 28,4 22,8 67,9 60,5 43,3 42,4 46,9 22,0 15,8 38,3 54,8 44,5 35,1
1980 - 35,8 76,1 45,5 43,7 - 30,1 30,2 22,9 69,3 57,9 48,3 45,1 43,4 32,2 20,0 42,7 54,5 45,2 36,6
1981 - 37,6 89,1 46,7 53,7 - 29,4 34,0 27,1 73,7 60,1 52,7 48,9 39,4 40,5 24,6 50,3 55,1 44,4 39,3
1982 - 40,0 99,3 52,4 65,5 - 33,4 37,9 29,8 79,4 65,1 56,3 54,2 34,3 43,4 31,0 59,6 53,9 49,3 43,8
1983 - 44,3 109,9 58,1 76,2 - 34,6 39,1 34,0 92,7 70,0 61,3 60,2 31,6 48,5 37,4 63,4 53,9 52,4 47,3
1984 - 46,8 113,9 61,2 77,5 - 36,3 40,6 40,9 96,8 75,2 63,4 64,2 31,9 54,0 43,7 64,7 60,8 54,0 50,3
1985 - 48,8 118,5 66,4 74,9 - 37,9 41,6 47,8 99,7 81,9 63,8 68,7 34,6 57,0 48,6 64,4 59,4 59,0 53,3
1986 - 53,2 123,5 70,5 71,8 - 38,8 41,5 48,4 110,8 86,2 67,1 70,6 43,0 66,8 49,4 63,9 58,6 62,6 55,1
1987 30,3 57,1 128,0 70,8 68,6 - 40,1 42,2 52,6 112,1 90,4 67,5 73,1 36,0 64,3 48,6 57,0 56,3 64,1 56,9
1988 25,8 58,4 128,0 70,3 66,7 - 40,0 42,2 62,7 108,5 92,5 65,8 76,0 35,1 65,0 45,0 51,3 49,9 64,7 57,2
1989 23,8 57,6 124,4 71,5 65,0 - 39,9 39,9 65,7 99,1 95,3 63,3 76,0 35,4 63,3 46,5 46,7 43,2 65,0 57,1
1990 22,6 56,8 124,9 74,5 65,8 14,3 39,5 42,0 89,0 92,6 103,7 61,5 75,6 32,4 65,3 48,5 42,7 39,1 66,6 59,5
1991 23,8 57,1 126,7 82,2 66,7 22,7 40,3 40,1 91,2 92,4 107,4 57,9 75,7 30,3 67,3 49,6 51,4 40,1 71,4 60,1
1992 28,1 57,0 128,1 90,4 70,6 45,3 44,7 43,4 97,5 90,0 116,1 59,3 76,4 36,1 59,9 52,1 68,6 46,9 74,1 64,1
1993 31,4 61,6 134,8 98,2 83,8 58,5 51,6 49,0 110,2 94,0 117,9 63,7 77,6 45,1 63,1 63,4 73,7 56,2 75,8 68,5
1994 41,1 64,6 132,7 98,7 77,7 60,0 55,3 49,2 107,9 88,1 124,0 68,8 74,0 43,5 63,8 65,5 77,9 53,7 75,0 70,2
1995 42,8 68,4 129,8 101,4 73,9 66,0 59,3 59,1 108,7 80,8 123,1 76,2 75,5 41,1 65,9 68,4 76,9 58,9 74,5 74,3
1996 40,0 68,3 128,3 100,9 68,1 66,6 62,4 61,9 111,3 74,1 121,8 80,5 75,3 35,2 64,8 72,2 74,5 58,5 73,9 77,0
1997 38,3 63,9 123,0 97,9 64,7 64,9 64,7 62,8 108,5 65,3 119,8 84,6 70,3 31,5 62,0 70,9 74,0 58,9 71,6 77,0
1998 33,0 63,5 117,4 97,0 59,8 61,5 65,2 63,3 105,4 55,6 117,7 97,4 67,0 33,7 57,8 69,0 73,3 56,2 68,6 76,0
1999 26,2 64,9 114,3 93,0 55,4 63,4 65,0 63,5 104,4 51,9 116,6 105,3 63,7 34,6 58,3 67,6 68,3 53,0 65,1 75,3
2000 23,6 64,3 109,8 85,1 50,8 58,5 63,9 63,5 103,8 42,9 112,9 112,8 59,7 32,0 58,8 65,7 58,1 49,7 60,2 73,6
2001 22,6 63,4 104,8 80,3 46,7 53,6 62,6 63,3 100,3 33,5 108,9 119,4 56,5 24,7 57,3 62,1 52,3 46,9 56,2 71,4
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium.  38
 
Table 2: Primary Government Balance, % GDP 







1970 0,7       1,8       0,6       1,9       - 5,8       1,1       -1,1       - - -2,9       1,4       0,1       - 3,1       -0,3       3,7       - -0,4       -
1971 0,3       2,1       -0,3       1,2       - 5,6       0,8       -1,5       - - -4,6       0,8       0,5       - 2,6       -1,0       4,2       - -1,2       -
1972 -0,3       2,6       -1,9       1,2       - 4,6       0,9       -1,7       - - -6,9       -0,4       0,8       - 1,2       -0,1       3,2       - 0,2       -
1973 0,2       1,8       -1,0       2,7       - 6,6       0,8       -0,3       - - -6,1       0,3       2,5       - 1,8       0,8       2,7       - 1,3       -
1974 -0,9       1,8       0,1       3,0       - 5,1       0,3       -2,7       - - -5,6       0,1       1,5       - -1,2       -0,4       0,7       - 0,6       -1,7      
1975 -3,1       -1,7       -2,2       -1,4       - 6,2       -1,9       -6,2       -2,1       - -9,6       -2,9       -1,4       4,2       -4,8       -0,6       1,6       - -3,6       -4,0      
1976 -3,2       -2,5       -2,7       -0,5       - 8,2       -0,6       -3,4       -1,4       - -6,3       -3,5       -0,9       3,8       -6,0       -1,1       3,1       - -1,5       -2,5      
1977 -3,3       -0,9       -1,9       -1,7       - 6,8       -0,6       -2,0       -0,8       -4,3       -4,8       -3,4       0,7       2,5       -3,1       -1,4       0,4       - -0,4       -1,7      
1978 -3,8       -1,0       -2,3       -2,1       - 4,6       -1,5       -1,7       -0,2       -5,9       -5,9       -4,8       -0,8       0,9       -4,5       -2,2       -1,6       -1,7       0,5       -2,3      
1979 -1,9       -0,6       -2,5       -0,7       - 3,7       -0,1       -1,6       -0,7       -7,0       -5,7       -3,8       -1,6       2,3       -3,7       -2,0       -3,9       -0,4       0,8       -1,9      
1980 -0,8       0,0       -3,7       -1,2       - 3,5       0,5       -1,6       -0,7       -7,9       -3,9       -3,2       -2,6       5,6       8,2       -2,4       -4,2       -0,2       -0,7       -1,3      
1981 -1,0       0,2       -6,2       0,6       - 3,7       -1,0       -2,1       -5,7       -7,6       -6,0       -2,4       -3,3       4,8       -5,8       -4,0       -4,7       -0,5       0,1       -2,5      
1982 -2,0       -1,1       -3,6       -2,8       - 2,5       -1,7       -1,3       -4,4       -6,8       -4,7       -2,1       -3,9       3,7       -2,9       -5,7       -5,1       0,4       -2,2       -2,4      
1983 -3,0       -1,7       -3,4       -3,9       - 1,1       -1,3       -0,3       -4,1       -5,0       -3,6       -1,8       -2,5       5,8       -4,6       -4,6       -3,0       -0,2       -2,8       -1,8      
1984 -2,4       0,1       -1,4       -3,0       - 3,0       -0,8       0,4       -4,7       -2,8       -4,0       -0,1       -2,0       6,0       0,2       -4,3       -0,5       -0,6       -1,6       -1,3      
1985 -1,9       0,2       -0,1       -3,3       - 2,8       -1,0       1,1       -7,1       -3,4       -5,1       1,0       0,3       8,7       0,9       -4,8       -0,8       0,5       -1,8       -1,2      
1986 -0,7       -0,9       0,4       -1,7       - 2,7       -1,1       1,0       -5,6       -3,3       -3,8       0,7       -1,2       4,2       2,2       -3,4       1,0       0,6       -2,0       -1,0      
1987 1,2       -1,3       2,0       0,0       - 0,3       0,3       0,4       -3,6       -1,2       -3,8       2,0       -2,0       2,8       2,2       -0,5       5,8       1,2       -1,0       -0,6      
1988 2,7       -0,2       2,4       1,2       5,8       2,9       0,0       0,2       -5,1       2,3       -3,3       2,7       -0,5       0,3       3,4       -0,7       4,3       3,3       -0,3       -0,5      
1989 3,0       0,0       2,9       1,4       4,3       4,7       0,5       2,2       -7,9       4,6       -1,6       3,6       -1,2       -0,4       3,8       -0,3       5,7       3,4       0,2       0,7      
1990 1,5       0,8       4,0       0,7       2,7       3,6       0,3       -0,1       -7,4       3,4       -2,2       3,7       -1,6       0,4       3,0       -1,1       4,2       0,8       -0,8       -0,3      
1991 -1,3       0,4       3,0       -2,0       1,5       -3,1       0,2       -0,7       -3,4       2,8       -0,4       3,4       1,1       -2,0       1,8       -1,6       -1,0       -0,7       -1,3       -0,3      
1992 -3,5       1,4       2,2       -2,9       0,9       -7,6       -1,5       0,1       -2,7       2,2       1,4       2,1       0,0       -3,5       4,2       -0,7       -7,2       -4,5       -2,2       0,0      
1993 -2,7       -0,7       3,0       -2,7       0,6       -7,7       -3,0       -0,5       -2,8       2,1       2,1       -0,9       0,8       -2,7       0,1       -3,0       -10,8       -5,8       -1,4       -0,7      
1994 -1,0       -1,5       4,0       -0,6       0,8       -4,6       -2,4       0,2       2,1       2,6       1,4       -2,3       0,2       -0,2       0,2       -2,3       -9,0       -4,2       -0,2       -0,4      
1995 -0,2       -1,4       4,5       1,3       0,8       -2,8       -2,3       -0,1       1,0       1,7       3,5       -3,1       0,6       2,9       0,6       -2,4       -5,2       -2,8       0,6       0,0      
1996 0,9       0,0       4,6       3,4       1,8       -1,7       -0,6       -0,3       3,1       3,0       4,0       -3,5       2,9       6,1       1,5       -0,2       -0,2       -1,5       1,3       0,8      
1997 2,1       1,6       5,7       5,6       2,9       0,4       0,2       0,5       4,3       3,8       6,2       -2,3       3,2       7,4       1,8       1,2       1,4       0,9       2,4       2,0      
1998 2,5       1,2       6,2       5,9       3,3       3,0       0,5       1,4       5,4       4,6       4,9       -3,8       3,4       3,1       1,2       1,4       4,9       3,0       3,5       2,2      
1999 3,2       1,4       6,0       7,4       5,0       3,9       1,2       2,0       5,9       3,5       4,5       -5,7       4,3       4,3       1,3       2,2       4,8       3,3       3,8       2,6      
2000 2,1       1,5       6,4       7,0       4,7       5,1       1,3       1,8       5,6       3,5       4,5       -5,2       4,1       9,5       1,7       2,7       5,3       3,2       4,2       2,6      
2001 1,8       1,5       6,5       6,5       4,5       5,8       1,3       1,2       5,9       5,9       4,7       -4,9       3,3       10,3       1,8       3,0       5,8       3,0       4,0       2,5      
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium.  39
Table 3: Recent empirical evidence on the political-economic models of budget deficits 
Models   
of debt as a strategic variable  of conflicts among political parties  of budgetary institutions 
Roubini and Sachs (1989)    - coalition governments experienced higher deficits than did 
one-party, majoritarian governments 
 
Olsson and Edin (1991)    - argue that the political cohesion variable used by Roubini-
Sachs captures the effects of minority governments rather than 
majority coalition governments 
 
Grilli et al  (1991)  - short government durability plays a crucial 
role in explaining public deficits and debt 
  
Crain and Tollison (1993)  - legislature stability and executive term limits 
are correlated with less volatility of the budget 
  
De Haan and Sturm (1994)     - the growth of government debt is positively related to the 
frequency of government changes 
-  with left-wing governments the growth of the share of 
government spending in total output tends to be higher 
- the growth of government debt is negatively related 
to tight budget procedures 
Alesina and Perotti (1995)    - coalition governments are less likely to introduce successful 
fiscal adjustment measures 
 
Hahm (1996) 
  - the Roubini-Sachs approach is valid only in unstable 
parliamentary systems 
- in a stable parliamentary system, the strength of the 
government is hypothesized to have no systematic effect on the 
deficit 
- in a presidential regime, if the party in power is strong, there 
is a tendency for increases in the deficit 
 
De Haan and Sturm (1997)    - neither the growth of government debt nor the level of 
government spending is related to the corrected Roubini-Sachs 
power dispersion index 
- reinforce the idea that the Roubini-Sachs index has errors 
 
De Haan et al (1999)    - the type of government affects cross-country variation in 
fiscal policy 
- the number of political parties in government affects debt 
growth 
   40
  of debt as a strategic variable  of conflicts among political parties  of budgetary institutions 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999)    - the higher the number of parties in government, the more 
loose is fiscal policy 
- the growth of government debt is not associated neither with 
the Roubini-Sachs index nor with the Olsson-Edin variant 
 
Franzese (2001)  - finds no effects of the strategic use of debt     
Kirchgaessner (2001)      - balanced-budget rules have in most cases proved to 
be effective in cutting down public debt 
- budgetary procedures and the interaction between 
them and the electoral system matter 
- direct democracies promote fiscal discipline 
- fiscal federalism leads to a smaller size of the 
government 
Pettersson (2001)  - the frequency of government changes has no 
significant impact on the accumulation of debt 
- a left-wing party reduces the level of debt 
while a right-wing party does the opposite the 
higher the probability of defeat 
- the two political blocs have opposite 
incentives regarding the strategic use of debt 
- the results support the strategic explanation 
suggested by Persson and Svensson (1989) 
   
Volkerink and De Haan (2001)     - the number of spending ministers and the number of political 
parties affect the budget deficit 
- the number of parties in parliament also affects the budget 
 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002)     - the number of spending ministers and, to a lesser degree, the 
number of political parties in a coalition and ideology affect 
fiscal policy outcomes 
 
Lambertini (2003)  - finds little evidence of the strategic use of debt     
Spolaore  (2003)    - the degree of political fragmentation in society  plays a 
fundamental role in he dynamics of fiscal adjustment 
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